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Ukraine’s political crisis is universally viewed as the 
only obstacle to the country’s integration into the 
European Union. Typically, only two main causes 
for the crisis are recognized: the “Ukrainian mental-
ity” and a bad political leadership.
In contrast, the causes underlying the failure of 
Ukraine’s government that are presented in this 
study demonstrate that it is not any “mentality,” not 
Ukraine’s cultural and political history, not a bad 
elite, and not an East-West conflict that are hamper-
ing Ukraine’s European integration. In reality, it is 
the incomplete, fragmented desovietization of the 
country—one that, moreover, is not based on intro-
ducing European standards of government—that 
has sunk the country into chaos and hopelessness. 
Ukraine has made one huge step towards political 
and economic liberalization, but the other foot is 
stuck in the 1970s, in unreformed soviet public in-
stitution.
The sovietization of Ukraine
Back in 1991, Ukraine experienced a major shift in 
political regimes, opposite to the cataclysms that 
took place in 1917 and 199. In 199, Pavel Sudo-
platov, the notorious NKVD boss, the founder of 
the first soviet terrorist agency, who personally as-
sassinated Yevhen Konovalets on Stalin’s orders 
and oversaw the murders of Lev Trotsky and Stepan 
Bandera, who was in charge of the annexation of the 
Baltics, Belarus and Western Ukraine, – this Soviet 
General in his 199 memoirs1 gave a definition of so-
vietization:
“In L’viv, which in 199 was a bourgeois city, we 
had to undertake total sovietization. This meant 
the complete liquidation of private property and 
independent political activity. Sovietization was 
supported by ideological and organizational in-
struments.”
In short, brainwashing each person from birth 
through an upbringing and educational system that 
taught that person to live in the communist system. 
Of course, this was all supported by legislation, in-
stitutions and funding.
The prohibition of private property and political 
freedoms through institutional repression and ide-
ological filtering changed the minds and worlds of 
hundreds of millions of people. Alas, Homo sovieti-
cus remains—a mental, cultural and anthropologi-
cal phenomenon of the 0th century that is still very 
much alive in the 1st.
1 “Secret Tasks: The Memoirs of an unwanted witness–
a Soviet Spymaster” and “Special Operations. Luby-
anka and the Kremlin, 190–1950,” memoirs of Pavel 
Sudoplatov (1907–1996). Sudoplatov was known as 
“the main saboteur and terrorist of the Soviet Union.” 
During WWII, he headed the th Main Department of 
the Ministry of State Security, which was involved in 
sabotaging and eliminating enemies of the Stalin re-
gime.
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Sovietization used fear as the foundation, the glue 
and the motivation in the transformation process. 
Fear led unquestioning endorsement of the political 
system, undisputed obeisance of all commands, and 
the skills to survive in the face of omnipresent in-
formers. Fear was the basis for the “soviet values” of 
class intolerance and the suspicion of any free com-
munication.
The totalitarian soviet state machine was formed to 
serve one party and one ruler. The separation of pow-
ers into legislative, executive and judicial branches 
was unthinkable because it would have made the 
totalitarian system dysfunctional. Every smallest 
detail of life had to be decided by the Communist 
Party. Property, people’s lives—all belonged to the 
same sole ruler. The communist centrally-planned 
economy meant that a monster—a huge ministry 
called Gosplan or State Planning—calculated which 
factory, from the largest to the smallest, had to pro-
duce which goods. As a result, all consumer goods 
suffered from shortages in the Soviet Union: only in 
the South could you buy fur hats, only in the North 
swimming suits, and only in a Kyrgyz mountain vil-
lage shop, books by Russian poets. The command 
administration guidelines were all top-down: from 
the ministries to the regional, county, city, and vil-
lage party committees. Those who dared think about 
the cost of policies, undertake impact analysis, or 
consider stakeholders’ interests…were shot or sent 
to concentration camps. They were excluded from 
the Communist Party, of course, and that meant ex-
clusion from soviet life entirely.
Collapse into chaos
The collapse of the soviet system brought radical 
changes when Ukraine gained independence in 
1991: private property rights began to be restored, 
the political system switched from one-party to 
multi-party, the separation of powers into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches began, and 
slowly the country saw the formation of new social 
classes. In short, it was the beginning of legitimate-
ly competing political parties, competitive private 
business, self-governing communities, and the 
emergence of civil society.
Except that public administration and the civil ser-
vice never managed to change—not even names 
were changed. Totalitarian political control over 
public administration was destroyed, but was never 
replaced by a democratic system of control. To this 
day, the Ukrainian government does not under-
stand what this is. What’s worse, this gap has led 
to a dangerous lack of control and accountability 
in the country’s state administration—which holds 
the keys to all the nation’s wealth: the State Budget, 
natural resources, and the regulation of commercial 
activities. Government policies and decisions began 
to be lobbied by politicians and businesses alike (of-
ten with little delineation between the two groups!) 
without any rules or restrictions, whether totalitar-
ian or democratic and this whole sphere has become 
an infinite source of corruption.
In short, Ukraine has done something utterly un-
thinkable: allowed unrestricted, unlimited, uncon-
trolled liberalization of government administra-
tion. The KGB control of soviet times has gone, and 
nothing has been put in its place.
European-style democratic governing separates 
executive functions institutionally. Although these 
institutions have different names and numbers in 
different countries, they all have separate protected 
bodies to oversee public services and exercise finan-
cial control over public finance. Each controlling 
or supervisory function is executed by a separate 
government body that is both independent and pro-
tected from those whom it oversees. The situation in 
Ukraine is exactly the opposite: every public gov-
erning body both manages and supervises, effec-
tively acting as manager, employer, policy-maker, 
evaluator, inspector, and trainer.
A wrong turn on the way to reform
Although Ukraine has gone a remarkable way to-
wards the separation of powers as the basis for its 
political democracy, this process has not been fol-
lowed up with effective reform of public administra-
tion. Indeed, it went wrong from the very beginning. 
The country was oriented towards inappropriate 
goals like “strengthening the capacity of the civil 
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service,” and “organizing the moral ideal” of people 
in public service instead of introducing European 
standards that would have changed the public ad-
ministration system as radically as the political and 
economic spheres had been changed.
It was no surprise, then, that these “reforms” were 
more of a hindrance than a help. Wrongly-con-
ceived reforms simply strengthened a soviet admin-
istrative system that was completely incompatible 
with democracy, rather than radically transforming 
soviet “state management” into a democratic public 
administration in terms of principles and values. 
Large-scale legislative reform has been attempted 
in regional development, territorial-administrative 
structure and local government. It has not succeed-
ed. Numerous reform concepts propose strength-
ening decentralization and self-governing commu-
nities, but pay no attention to the main obstacle: 
unchanged soviet functions of state administration.
This partial reform has run into trouble at all its in-
compatible junctions. Every attempt at regional de-
velopment gets enmired in a conflict between the 
new democratic nature of local government and un-
reformed soviet-minded central bodies. Territorial 
administrations are expected to replicate the job of 
the new local governments, that is, to take responsi-
bility for the social and economic development of a 
given territory—just as they used to do in the soviet 
era as regional Communist Party executive commit-
tees.
The obstacles to decentralization are evident in the 
everyday operation of public administration, in the 
behavior of civil servants, in the nature and quality 
of public services—these have not only not changed 
their soviet nature but have become much worse be-
cause there is no control over them.
 The concept of regional policy dated 9.08.008, Con-
cept of Local Government Reform dated 11.1.008, 
Draft of Reform of the Administrative-Territorial 
Structure of Ukraine dated 11.1.008, Bill of Ukraine 
“On the basis of regional policy” (Revised 08.10.08), 
on-lline version, Ministry of Regional Development 
and Construction of Ukraine, http://www.minregion-
bud.gov.ua.
Because the reform of anti-corruption legislation 
launched in 1995 was not properly oriented, it failed 
to bring any results. The basic anti-corruption law, 
“On Fighting Corruption,” has been amended 11 
times since 1995. More than 70 judicial acts, includ-
ing 1 laws and 1 Cabinet resolutions have been 
produced to fight corruption. Yet, no practical prog-
ress has been achieved because of the wrong direc-
tion chosen from the very beginning.
Ukraine’s Law “On Fighting Corruption,” adopted in 
1995, has reduced the battle against corruption to a 
matter of misdemeanors (administrative violations). 
The law’s orientation on fighting corruption that has 
already taken place, rather than on preventing and 
eliminating the underlying causes and conditions 
lead to corrupted actions, made it impossible to se-
riously reduce the level of corruption in Ukraine. 
Special restrictions included in this Law that are in-
tended to prevent corruption do not perform a pre-
ventive function, because they are not supported by 
other regulations establishing the rules of conduct 
for public servants. For similar reasons, the 1997 Na-
tional Program against Corruption known as “Op-
eration Clean Hands” failed to work, too.
Indeed, today we can say with certainty that, despite 
all these efforts, the situation in Ukraine has actu-
ally deteriorated.
Needed: A better roadmap
What makes Ukraine’s anti-corruption legislation 
so ineffective, despite all the changes? What distin-
guishes it from the anti-corruption legislation in EU 
countries that appears to be working?
For starters, there is the vagueness of how corrupt 
actions are defined, no clear connection to specific 
punishments, and no independent corruption con-
trol in the anti-corruption legislation Ukrainian leg-
islation  encourages corruption by eliminating any 
risk that a public servant will actually be punished. 
By contrast, Western legal and institutional frame-
works are strict and explicit, which enables them to 
work as a strong disincentive to succumb to corrup-
tion.
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An additional source of corruption lies in the insti-
tutional factors that were mentioned earlier, that is, 
the totalitarian top-down subordination of oversight 
functions within the executive branch.
In practice, this means that, without changing the 
very principles on which Ukraine’s anti-corruption 
legislation is based, nothing can be done today to 
combat or prevent corruption in Ukraine. There is 
no room for simply “tweaking” the legal base since 
it is wrong to its very core.
What kind of legislation would actually work? Does 
Ukraine need to re-invent the wheel? Of course not. 
SIGMA provides the criteria for an effective legis-
lative framework: identifying and punishing viola-
tions; preventing discretionary decisions; protecting 
the independence of supervisory bodies from those 
under supervision; controlling and monitoring orga-
nizations, procedures and standards, both manda-
tory and regular; providing constant oversight over 
the effectiveness of legislated norms and rules; and 
mandating the universal application of deontological 
rules, that is, a code of conduct for public servants.
Despite dozens of government bills and concept 
papers on fighting corruption, despite hundreds of 
millions spent on international experts, corruption 
continues to spread in Ukraine.
For one thing, Ukraine’s government has not follow-
ed the recommendations of Group of states against 
corruption (GRECO):5 less than one third of the rec-
ommendations in the Evaluation Report of 11-15 
 Ukraine: An evaluation of the government system, 
March 006, SIGMA Support and Improvement in Gov-
ernment Management, a special initiative of the OECD 
and the EU financed primarily by EU funds: http://
www.sigmaweb.org/dataoecd/7/1/7178.pdf. 
State management assessment based on SIGMA pri-
mary indicators: http://www.center.gov.ua/storinki-
sigma/ocinka-derzhavnogo-upravlinnya-za-bazovi-
mi-pokaznikami-sigma.html.
 Christian Vigoroux, Déontologie des Fonctions Pub-
liques, Paris, Édition Dalloz, 006, 58 pp.
5 Joint First and Second Evaluation Rounds, Evalua-
tion Report on Ukraine, adopted by GRECO at its 
nd Plenary Meeting in Strasbourg, 19– March 
007: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/
evaluations/round/GrecoEval1-(006)_Ukraine_
EN.pdf.
May 009, that reviewed the steps taken by the Gov-
ernment of Ukraine to carry out 5 recommenda-
tions posted in the Annual Report on the joint 1st and 
nd joint assessment rounds undertaken 19- March 
007. Neither were the recommendations adopted 
under the Istanbul plan of the Anti-corruption Net-
work of the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) for the Central Europe 
and Central Asia countries carried out, either.
Two GRECO comments regarding recommenda-
tions and evaluations should demonstrate how 
vague and non-binding they sound for the Ukrainian 
public servants: “GRECO recommended creating a 
body…which may be given the necessary level of in-
dependence for performing an efficient monitoring 
function” and “The positive changes in this field are 
potentially capable of indicating a breakthrough in 
the process of setting up a fully functional anti-cor-
ruption body in Ukraine. However, it is still to be 
seen the extent to which the method of implemen-
tation of the post of Main Representative for anti-
corruption policy will promote the creation of anti-
corruption authority.”
Recommendation ХІІІ: “GRECO recommends de-
termining the overall strategy of reform in public 
administration in Ukraine in order to ensure com-
mon understanding of the need for change and in-
forming the general public.” Regrettably, this rec-
ommendation is not connected to the international 
assistance planning of public administration reform.
Overall, the recommendations are not likely to have 
a perceptible impact because it is too easy to imple-
ment them in bits and pieces. They are not priori-
tized or organized according to importance, indis-
pensability or urgency. Ukraine’s Government is 
given complete freedom of choice “to do or not to 
do” because the advice is couched in too many dip-
lomatic niceties. This kind of “diplomacy,” when it 
comes to serious reforms, especially regarding cor-
ruption, does more harm than good.
On 11 June 009, the Verkhovna Rada adopted yet 
another package of anti-corruption laws that came 
into force on 1 January 010.
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The new anti-corruption laws sound serious be-
cause the term “prohibited” is used for the first 
time. A long list of violations is included, which is 
also revolutionary. But responsibility for ignoring or 
disregarding information received as a result of anti-
corruption audits is not properly determined. Audit 
results can be thrown away and the perpetrators go 
unpunished. Worse, the body charged with super-
vising the implementation of anti-corruption legis-
lation is Cabinet of Ministers, which means there is 
no oversight because the overseer is Suspect #1!
The Ukrainian partners in international anti-corrup-
tion projects are usually public servants (key suspects) 
rather than the legislature, self-governing communi-
ties, business and civil society (main victims).
What EU standards in Ukraine’s public administra-
tion will mean
Changing the basic principles underlying legis-
lation to exclude discretionary decision-making 
and include strictly defined norms and proce-
dures for the decision-making process, tying vio-
lations of those norms to inevitable penalties.
Instituting the mandatory separation of functions 
that inevitably lead to corruption when all in one 
entity: supervision, policy-making, financial au-
dit & control, administrative audit and control, 
independent dispute arbitration, hiring and fir-
ing, independent performance reviews and pro-
motions, and statistics.
Introducing a new function called “prefects” at 
the local level to promote national interests in 
lieu of the soviet centralized command adminis-
trations and strengthening the new, democratic 
local community governments by providing 
them with their own administrations.
Establishing EU democratic public service stan-
dards for politicians, ordinary citizens and busi-
nesses. For voters, this means providing a com-
plete list of mandatory information about services 
provided by each public official and a list of ac-
tions a citizen needs to take to obtain the service. 
Open information makes bribery obsolete.
Including new services for politicians: impact 
analysis, cost of inaction, consultations with 
stakeholders, analysis of stakeholder positions, 
•
•
•
•
•
communication strategies, and political, eco-
nomic, financial, and social forecasts.
Understanding that, in order to overcome and 
prevent corruption in Ukraine, the existing sys-
tem of anti-corruption legislation cannot be 
tweaked because in essence it is opposite to 
democratic legal systems for preventing corrup-
tion. The same concerns territorial governing. 
Endless efforts to “fix” legislation are canceled 
out by the contradiction between the new, demo-
cratic nature of community governments and the 
totalitarian nature of the country’s central ad-
ministration.
As long as Ukraine’s Government lacks the EU dem-
ocratic standards of expertise and skills to work in 
the context of multi-party political competition 
and mandatory openness, any reform projects are 
doomed to failure.
Ukraine risks losing its hard-won political freedoms 
because of unreformed government institutions that 
are not designed to establish a new democratic social 
order. When freedom is equated with chaos, corrup-
tion and crime, voters tend to prefer “order without 
freedom.” The bottom line for Ukraine to succeed is 
to be aware of the clash between its totalitarian fos-
sils and EU democratic systems of governing.
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